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Recent Developments 
State v. Rucker: 
A Brief Investigatory Stop is Not a Restraint on Freedom of Movement 
Characteristic of a Formal Arrest and Does Not Require Miranda Warnings 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland held a brief 
investigatory stop is not a restraint 
on freedom of movement charac-
teristic of a formal arrest and does 
not require Miranda warnings. 
State v. Rucker, 374 Md. 199,821 
A.2d 439 (2003). The court of 
appeals followed the recent trend 
of Supreme Court rulings, which 
require formal custody or restraint 
on freedom characteristic of a 
formal arrest as the ultimate inquiry 
in determining whether a suspect is 
in custody for Miranda purposes. 
Id. 
On December 31, 2000, a 
confidential informant tipped police 
that Terrance Rucker ("Rucker") 
was among a number of individuals 
involved in narcotics trafficking. A 
few days later, the informant 
accompanied Detectives Powell and 
Piazza to a shopping mall parking 
lot where Rucker was indentified as 
he went to his car. Powell 
immediately instructed Corporal 
Grimes to stop Rucker until they 
arrived at the scene. Grimes' patrol 
car pulled up behind Rucker's 
parked car, leaving space in front 
of Rucker's car. Grimes asked 
Rucker for his license and 
registration. Meanwhile, the two 
detectives arrived. Detective 
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Powell asked Rucker, "[ d]o you 
have anything you are not supposed 
to have?" Rucker replied, "[y]es, I 
do, it's in my pocket." Powell asked 
what it was and Rucker replied 
cocaine, at which point Rucker was 
arrested. 
The trial court held Rucker 
was in custody, had not been read 
his Miranda rights, and suppressed 
the confession. The State filed an 
interlocutory appeal. The court of 
special appeals affirmed, holding 
although the stop was valid, what 
occurred after the stop changed the 
character of the event and the stop 
became the functional equivalent of 
a de facto arrest requiring Miranda 
warnings. The court of appeals 
granted certiorari. 
The court of appeals began its 
analysis by noting the first step in 
determining whether a Miranda 
warning is required is to determine 
if the defendant was in custody. ld. 
at 208, 821 A.2d at 444. The court 
reviewed Miranda s history and 
subsequent case law concerning 
custodial questioning. ld. Custodial 
questioning is "initiated by law 
enforcement officers after a person 
has been taken into custody or 
otherwise deprived of his freedom 
of action in any significant way." Id. 
(quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 
U.S. 436,444 (1966». 
The court of appeals uses a 
two-part test to determine whether 
a defendant was in custody. Id. at 
210, 821 A.2d at 446. First, the 
court considers circumstances 
surrounding the interrogation. ld. 
Second, given those circumstances, 
the court considers whether a rea-
sonable person would believe he 
or she was at liberty to terminate 
the interrogation and leave. Id. 
Since Miranda, Supreme Court 
rulings added a third and final step 
to the inquiry: whether there was a 
"formal arrest or restraint on 
freedom of movement of the degree 
associated with a formal arrest." 
Id. at 211,821 A.2d 439,446. 
In the case at bar, the court of 
appeals held the circumstances of 
Rucker's stop brief and investiga-
tory and they remained so when 
Rucker told police he had cocaine. 
Id. at 212, 821 A.2d at 446. 
Rucker was not in custody for 
Miranda purposes because he was 
not restrained to a degree asso-
ciated with formal arrest. Id. 
Rucker was asked a single question 
in a public parking lot, the stop took 
less than one hour, and no law en-
forcement officer drew a weapon. 
Id. at 221, 821 A.2d at 452. 
Accordingly, Miranda warnings 
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were not required before police 
asked Rucker whether he had 
anything illegal. Id 
The court of appeals 
concluded this particular stop was 
not a de facto arrest. Id. at 221, 
821 A.2d at 452. The court cited 
Berkemer v. McCarty, which con-
sidered questioning during a brief 
investigatory stop on a public street, 
where potential eyewitnesses could 
be drawn to the scene, not custodial 
for Miranda purposes. Id. (citing 
Berkemer, 468 U.S. 420 (1984)). 
Such a stop is only considered cus-
todial if it is of a degree associated 
with formal arrest or if it develops 
into a formal arrest. Id. at 218-19, 
821 A.2d at 450. 
In addition, the court cited two 
Maryland cases that held coercive 
circumstances similar to the instant 
case were not custodial for Miranda 
purposes. In McAvoy v. State, a 
suspect's car was pulled over by 
police and he was asked to perform 
a lengthy field sobriety test, which 
he failed. Id. at 220, 821 A.2d at 
451 (citing McAvoy, 314 Md. 509, 
551 A.2d875 (1989)). Next,in In 
re David 8., a suspect was thrown 
down and handcuffed when he 
appeared to reach for a gun. Id. at 
216, 821 A.2d at 449 (citing In re 
David, 367 Md. 523, 789 A.2d 607 
(2002)). As in Rucker's situation, 
each stop was conducted in public, 
was brief, and did not lead to formal 
arrests for 'Miranda purposes, 
despite their seemingly coercive 
nature. 
The Rucker decision sends a 
strong message that despite the 
authoritative nature of a brief 
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investigatory stop by law enforce-
ment officers, the standard remains 
that these types of stops will not 
require Miranda warnings unless 
the suspect is restrained to a degree 
associated with formal arrest or 
placed under formal arrest. If a 
suspect is restrained to such a 
degree, the constitutional right 
against being compelled to make 
self- incriminating statements comes 
into play. This ruling preserves the 
rights oflaw enforcement officers to 
investigate illegal activity without 
Miranda warnings and signals 
defense attorneys to be aware that 
this standard must be met before a 
motion to suppress a defendant's 
statements will be granted. 
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